Skip to content

Security: rled7/Production-grade-cloud-project

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Email the maintainer privately rather than opening a public issue. Include:

  • The version (git rev-parse HEAD) you reproduced on.
  • Repro steps, ideally a minimal curl or k6 script.
  • Impact assessment as you see it.

A reply (acknowledgement) is expected within 3 business days; a fix or mitigation plan within 14 days of acknowledgement, depending on severity.

Supported versions

This is a reference / benchmark project, not a long-lived library. The main branch is the only supported version; older tags are historical.

In-scope

  • Authentication/authorization bypass in any of the four services (apps/js, apps/python, apps/c, apps/cpp).
  • JWT validation bugs (signature, expiry, malformed token handling).
  • API-key gate bypass.
  • SQL injection via the data endpoints.
  • Container escape via the published Docker images.
  • IAM privilege escalation or wildcards in the Terraform modules.
  • Secrets leakage (Secrets Manager handling, environment variables, log lines, error responses).

Out of scope

  • Findings against the demo seed user (admin@local / supersecret from docker-compose.yml). That account is intentionally weak — production deploys override ADMIN_EMAIL / ADMIN_PASSWORD.
  • DoS findings against the rate-limit threshold (waf_rate_limit, default 2000 reqs/5min/IP). Tune in your own deployment.
  • Cosmetic CSP / clickjacking issues on /health (a JSON endpoint, not a page).
  • Findings that require the operator to set JWT_SECRET="" or API_KEY="" — both env vars are explicitly documented as "auth disabled" toggles for the test suites.

Hardening notes for operators

  • terraform/environments/prod/terraform.tfvars MUST stay gitignored; it holds the DB password, API key, and JWT secret.
  • Generate jwt_secret with openssl rand -hex 64; rotate by setting the new value, applying, and invalidating outstanding sessions out of band (no graceful in-flight rotation for JWT yet).
  • API-key rotation: api_key_next is supported — see README for the graceful overlap procedure.
  • The chaos suite (benchmark/chaos_test.sh) is destructive — never point BASE_URL at a production endpoint without dropping RATE_LIMIT_FLOOD to a small number first.

There aren't any published security advisories