pyxis: allow unprivileged user namespaces so enroot works on Ubuntu 23.10+ - #1392
pyxis: allow unprivileged user namespaces so enroot works on Ubuntu 23.10+#1392100milliongold wants to merge 2 commits into
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…3.10+ Ubuntu 23.10 and later ship with kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Under that default, enroot-nsenter fails when pyxis starts a container: enroot-nsenter: failed to create user namespace: Permission denied The nvidia.enroot galaxy role does not handle this, and DeepOps lists Ubuntu 24.04 LTS as a supported OS, so container jobs are broken out of the box on a supported platform. Add a sysctl task on compute nodes, gated on the presence of the knob in /proc rather than on the distribution version, so it is a no-op on kernels built without AppArmor userns restrictions. Observed on DGX OS 7.5.0 (Ubuntu-based) with Slurm 26.05.1 and pyxis 0.11.1: srun --container-image=... failed with the message above until the sysctl was set. Signed-off-by: Jea-Eok-Kim <je.kim@xiilab.com>
dholt
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Please replace the unconditional host-wide sysctl change with a narrowly scoped AppArmor policy for enroot-nsenter and provide evidence from a real Pyxis/Enroot container launch on an affected supported OS. If a global sysctl fallback is still needed for unusual installations, make it an explicit, documented, default-off administrator choice rather than changing the security default whenever the kernel knob exists.
Automated triage review (agent-generated on the maintainer's behalf; a human maintainer decides merges).
Clearing kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns lets every process on the host create unprivileged user namespaces, which is the attack surface the Ubuntu default was added to reduce. The role now installs an AppArmor profile that grants the userns capability to /usr/bin/enroot-nsenter alone and leaves the host default in place. enroot-nsenter is the only enroot executable that references CLONE_NEWUSER (checked against enroot 3.2.0-1), so the profile does not need to cover enroot-mount, enroot-switchroot, enroot-mksquashovlfs or enroot-aufs2ovlfs. The host-wide sysctl remains available for installations where the profile cannot be used, but it is now an explicit, documented, default-off choice: pyxis_userns_allow_globally, false by default. If the profile fails to load the play stops with the parser error and points at that variable, rather than silently falling back to the weaker setting. Both paths stay a no-op where /proc/sys/kernel/apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns does not exist, and the profile path additionally requires apparmor_parser. Evidence so far, on a DGX B300 running DGX OS 7.5 (Ubuntu 24.04.4, AppArmor 4.0 ABI available): $ apparmor_parser -Q -T -v enroot-nsenter Addition succeeded for "enroot-nsenter". $ grep -l CLONE_NEWUSER /usr/bin/enroot-* /usr/bin/enroot-nsenter What is still missing is a container launch on a host where the restriction is active. This node was already worked around out-of-band (/etc/sysctl.d/91-enroot.conf, not owned by any package, sets the knob to 0), so it is not in the affected state, and restoring the restriction to reproduce the failure would break the Pyxis jobs currently running on it. I will add the before/after launch output once the node is free; please hold the merge until then if that evidence is required.
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Agreed on all three points — clearing What changed (commit
Why the profile only covers Checked against enroot 3.2.0-1, so Evidence so far, on a DGX B300 running DGX OS 7.5 (Ubuntu 24.04.4, AppArmor 4.0 ABI available): What is still missing, and I would rather say so than leave it implied: I do not have a container launch on a host where the restriction is active. This node was already worked around out-of-band before I picked up the issue — I will add the before/after launch output once the node is free. Please hold the merge until then if that evidence is required — I would rather this sit than be merged on a parser check alone. |
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The node is free now, so here is the container launch evidence I said I would add. To produce it I had to put this host into the affected state first: it carries an out-of-band Environment Before — restriction active, no profile Install the profile After — same launch, profile loaded, restriction still active The knob reads 1 during both launches. That is the part I wanted on the record: the container starts with the OS security default left in place, which is what your review asked for and what the original patch did not do. Afterwards the profile was unloaded and removed, Two notes on the run itself. The image is plain |
Problem
Ubuntu 23.10 and later set
kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1by default. Under that default,enroot-nsenterfails as soon as pyxis starts a container:The
nvidia.enrootgalaxy role does not handle this, and DeepOps lists Ubuntu 24.04 LTS as a supported OS, so container jobs do not work out of the box on a supported platform.Observed on DGX OS 7.5.0 (Ubuntu-based), Slurm 26.05.1, pyxis 0.11.1.
Fix
Add a sysctl task in
roles/pyxisfor compute nodes. The task is gated on the presence of/proc/sys/kernel/apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_usernsrather than onansible_distribution_version, so it is a no-op on kernels built without AppArmor userns restrictions and does not need updating for future releases.Note on hardening
This relaxes a system-wide hardening default: unprivileged user namespaces are what AppArmor is restricting here. A narrower alternative is an AppArmor profile scoped to
enroot-nsenter(as packaged by some distributions for other userns consumers). If maintainers prefer that approach, I am happy to rework the patch.The sysctl is written to
/etc/sysctl.d/60-enroot-userns.confso it is visible and revertible, rather than being applied only at runtime.