diff --git a/.agents/skills/signer-slack-msg/SKILL.md b/.agents/skills/signer-slack-msg/SKILL.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9c5d086..0000000
--- a/.agents/skills/signer-slack-msg/SKILL.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
----
-name: signer-slack-msg
-description: Write the Slack message that accompanies a Safe msig batch for Nest signers — max-decoded call list, intent-first one-line description, expected SafeTxHash, and Transaction/Simulation placeholders. Use when generating slack.md for any msig batch artifact.
----
-
-# Signer Slack message
-
-Audience: Safe signers reviewing before signing. The decoded calls ARE the documentation — the prose states INTENT only, never re-explains individual calls. Follow the curated style of `generated/nBASIS-timelock-migration-v2/56/slack.md` and nCREDIT v2 equivalents.
-
-**Grammar version: `nest-signer-message/1`.** The normative specification is [`docs/signer-message-grammar.md`](../../../docs/signer-message-grammar.md); SafeVerify (`plume-hub:packages/safe-verify/GRAMMAR.md`) reads a byte-identical copy, and both repositories pin its SHA-256. Generated messages MUST declare the pragma and MUST carry an explicit `op=`, `value=` and `sig=` on every call — a message without `op=`/`value=` is parsed under legacy defaults (`op=call value=0`) and mismatches whenever the batch actually delegatecalls or sends value, and one without `sig=` pins no selector, so an overload of the same name reads identically. `sig=` is the canonical ABI signature (`setUserRole(address,uint8,bool)`); the verifier derives its selector and compares it byte-for-byte. Run `pnpm check:signer-grammar` after editing either file.
-
-## Structure (exactly this shape)
-
-````
-:signed: @nestowners
-<VAULT> on <ChainName> (<chainId>) — <one sentence of intent, ≤2 lines>.
-
-*Queue 1 — one Safe batch, op Safe (0xa08a…a982), <N> calls*
-```
-grammar: nest-signer-message/1
-[0] <fn>(<argName>=<label>(<0xshort…addr>), …) -> <targetLabel>(<0xshort…addr>) op=call value=0 sig=<fn>(<type>,<type>)
-[1] …
-[k] scheduleBatch(<n> calls, predecessor=0x…, salt=0x…, delay=30s) -> newPT(0x8faa…b23a) op=call value=0 sig=scheduleBatch(address[],uint256[],bytes[],bytes32,bytes32,uint256)
-       └ acceptOwnership() -> accountant(0x5127…8910) op=call value=0 sig=acceptOwnership()
-       └ acceptOwnership() -> composer(0x…) op=call value=0 sig=acceptOwnership()
-```
-<1-2 sentence execution note: what executes now vs what is permissionless later.>
-Expected SafeTxHash: <0x… computed from the exact final Safe transaction, including its nonce>
-Transaction: <paste Safe tx URL>
-Simulation: <paste Tenderly / Den simulation URL>
-````
-
-## Rules
-
-- **Intent-first description**: what this batch achieves + where ownership lands. Example: "combined vault implementation upgrade (upgradeAndCall to freshly-deployed impls) + hook/seizer swap to common v2, all surfaces handed to the new Protocol Timelock 0x8fAA…b23A; final call schedules the acceptOwnership batch (executes permissionlessly ≥30s later)." Do NOT enumerate what the calls do — they're listed below.
-- **Max decode every call**: function name + named args + symbolic labels for every address (`share`, `vaultAuthority`, `newHook`, `oldSharedSeizer`, `newPT`, `opSafe`, `accountant`, `composer`, `proxyAdmin(share)` …). Address format: `label(0xAbCd…1234)` — first 6 + last 4 hex chars.
-- **Nested timelock calls**: `scheduleBatch`/`executeBatch` show inner calls indented with `└`, each decoded the same way.
-- Unknown selector: NEVER leave raw calldata silently — decode via `cast 4byte`/ABI and add the label; if genuinely unresolvable, write a complete canonical line whose advisory sits in a `#` comment (the only form the parser ignores) and which carries no `sig=`, because the selector is already stated: `[i] UNKNOWN 0x12345678 -> target(0x…) op=call value=0  # ⚠ decode before signing`.
-- Role numbers get meaning inline once, in the documented `<number>/<NAME>` form the parser compares as a number: `role=15/SEIZER`. A parenthesised gloss (`15 (seizer)`) is opaque to the verifier and is reported as uncomparable.
-- A call that carries no calldata is written `[i] nativeTransfer() -> recipient(0x…) op=call value=<wei>` — reserved spelling, no arguments, no `sig=`.
-- Companion permissionless artifact (accept-execute.json) gets one line in the execution note — not a separate Queue section — since signers don't sign it.
-- **Expected SafeTxHash is mandatory**: compute it independently from the exact signer-ready Safe transaction, including the Safe address, chain ID, final nonce, target, value, calldata, operation, and Safe gas/refund fields. Recompute it after any payload or nonce change. A signer-ready message must contain the full `0x` hash, never a placeholder; signers use it as the out-of-band value against which the transaction presented by the signing workflow is verified.
-- `Transaction:`/`Simulation:` stay as `<paste …>` placeholders; the proposal workflow fills them after proposing and simulating the exact transaction.
-- No @Ruan unless the batch needs council; default header exactly `:signed: @nestowners`.
-- Keep total message paste-ready: no markdown headers, use Slack `*bold*` and triple-backtick blocks as shown.
diff --git a/tools/check-signer-message-grammar.mjs b/tools/check-signer-message-grammar.mjs
index f469549..42dded7 100644
--- a/tools/check-signer-message-grammar.mjs
+++ b/tools/check-signer-message-grammar.mjs
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 // Pin check for the shared signer-message grammar.
 //
-// The generator (.agents signer-slack-msg skill) and the verifier
-// (plume-hub:packages/safe-verify) must agree on exactly one grammar. Both
-// repositories carry a byte-identical copy of docs/signer-message-grammar.md and
-// pin its SHA-256; a copy that drifts on either side fails its own check instead
-// of being silently reinterpreted.
+// The public grammar reference must match the verifier copy in
+// plume-hub:packages/safe-verify. Both repositories pin its SHA-256; a copy that
+// drifts on either side fails its own check instead of being silently reinterpreted.
 //
 //   node tools/check-signer-message-grammar.mjs
 //
@@ -21,7 +19,6 @@ export const GRAMMAR_REFERENCE_PATH = "docs/signer-message-grammar.md";
 export const GRAMMAR_REFERENCE_SHA256 =
   "d5e4d18e0d558ece88c16bd2489a4a79c687736f1a9a3ac815f6f1088f496e55";
 
-const SKILL_PATH = ".agents/skills/signer-slack-msg/SKILL.md";
 const faults = [];
 
 const referencePath = join(ROOT, GRAMMAR_REFERENCE_PATH);
@@ -45,62 +42,6 @@ if (!existsSync(referencePath)) {
   }
 }
 
-const skillPath = join(ROOT, SKILL_PATH);
-if (!existsSync(skillPath)) {
-  faults.push(`${SKILL_PATH} is missing`);
-} else {
-  const text = readFileSync(skillPath, "utf8");
-  if (!text.includes(GRAMMAR_VERSION))
-    faults.push(`${SKILL_PATH} does not pin ${GRAMMAR_VERSION}`);
-  if (!text.includes("grammar: " + GRAMMAR_VERSION))
-    faults.push(`${SKILL_PATH} does not show the grammar pragma`);
-  if (!text.includes("op=call value=0"))
-    faults.push(
-      `${SKILL_PATH} does not require explicit op=/value= on every call`,
-    );
-
-  // Every example call line is itself an instruction: an incomplete one teaches the generator to
-  // emit a message the canonical parser rejects. Each is checked for the mandatory modifiers.
-  const lines = text.split("\n");
-  lines.forEach((line, position) => {
-    const call = /^\s*(?:\[\d+\]|└─?|↳|\\_)\s*(.+)$/.exec(line);
-    if (!call) return;
-    const body = call[1].replace(/\s+#.*$/, "");
-    const where = `${SKILL_PATH}:${position + 1}`;
-    // `[1] …` is an elision inside the shape template, not a declared call. Only a bare ellipsis
-    // qualifies; anything else must be a complete call line, arrow included.
-    if (/^(?:…|\.{3})$/.test(body.trim())) return;
-    if (!body.includes("->")) {
-      faults.push(`${where} example call line declares no -> <target>`);
-      return;
-    }
-    if (!/\bop=(call|delegatecall)\b/.test(body))
-      faults.push(`${where} example call line declares no op=`);
-    if (!/\bvalue=\S+/.test(body))
-      faults.push(`${where} example call line declares no value=`);
-
-    const isUnknown = /\bUNKNOWN\s+0x[0-9a-fA-F]{8}\b/.test(body);
-    const isNativeTransfer = /\bnativeTransfer\(\s*\)/.test(body);
-    const hasSignature = /\bsig=\S/.test(body);
-    if (!isUnknown && !isNativeTransfer && !hasSignature) {
-      faults.push(
-        `${where} example call line declares no sig=<name(type,type)>`,
-      );
-    }
-    if ((isUnknown || isNativeTransfer) && hasSignature) {
-      faults.push(
-        `${where} example call line declares sig= on a call that pins no signature`,
-      );
-    }
-  });
-
-  // A parenthesised role gloss is opaque to the verifier; the documented form is `15/SEIZER`.
-  if (/\brole=\d+\s*\(/.test(text))
-    faults.push(
-      `${SKILL_PATH} shows the opaque \`role=<n> (name)\` form instead of <n>/<NAME>`,
-    );
-}
-
 if (faults.length) {
   console.error(
     `[signer-grammar] FATAL ${faults.length} problem(s):\n` +
@@ -110,5 +51,5 @@ if (faults.length) {
 }
 
 console.log(
-  `[signer-grammar] ${GRAMMAR_VERSION} pinned; ${GRAMMAR_REFERENCE_PATH} sha256 ${GRAMMAR_REFERENCE_SHA256}; generator skill agrees`,
+  `[signer-grammar] ${GRAMMAR_VERSION} pinned; ${GRAMMAR_REFERENCE_PATH} sha256 ${GRAMMAR_REFERENCE_SHA256}`,
 );